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445 
LOST IN INTERPRETATION: THE PROBLEM  
OF PLEA BARGAINS AND COURT 
INTERPRETATION FOR NON-ENGLISH-
SPEAKING DEFENDANTS 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 26, 1991, Mr. Irving Chin pled guilty to charges arising 
from an alleged illegal gambling operation.1 Yet, Chin pled guilty without 
realizing that he would be “regarded as a criminal.”2 His co-defendant, Mr. 
Chi Chak Leung, similarly pled guilty to related charges despite 
consistently asserting that his only role in the gambling operation was 
cashing chips.3 Since neither Chin nor Leung spoke English and their court 
interpreters failed to convey the serious consequences of a guilty plea, 
both men unwittingly waived away fundamental constitutional rights in a 
language they did not understand.4 Consequently, Chin and Leung filed a 
motion to withdraw their guilty pleas due to cultural and language 
barriers.5 Upon evaluating both men’s motions to withdraw their pleas, a 
United States district court found that the two defendants faced “linguistic 
and cultural difficulties” during the plea bargaining process.6 When the 
court evaluated Leung’s responses during the plea colloquy, it determined 
that Leung “lack[ed] . . . an adequate understanding . . . of the nature of the 
charges he was pleading to.”7 In fact, Leung informed the court that he 
would not have agreed to the plea bargain “even with a gun to his head” if 
he had understood the consequences of the guilty plea.8 The court noted 
that Chin did not even understand particular words involved in the plea 
bargain.9 As a result, the Leung court allowed both Leung and Chin to 
withdraw their guilty pleas.10  
 
 
 1. United States v. Leung, 783 F. Supp. 357, 358 (N.D. Ill. 1991).  
 2. Id. at 359. 
 3. Id. at 358. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 360.  
 7. Id. The Leung court found that Leung actually had denied the guilt component of the plea 
agreement and did not understand the details of his plea. Id. at 361.  
 8. Id. at 358.  
 9. Id. In its decision, the Leung court also considered an affidavit from Chin’s former counsel 
who attested to Chin’s “lack of understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea.” Id. at 361. 
 10. Id.  
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In another case, Perez-Lastor v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service,11 Mr. Perez-Lastor, a Guatemalan citizen and a Quiche Indian, 
was denied asylum by the Bureau of Immigration Affairs (BIA).12 
Although a Quiche interpreter was provided during the immigration 
proceedings, Perez-Lastor indicated multiple times on the record that “he 
could barely understand” the BIA judge’s questions.13 Perez-Lastor 
appealed the BIA decision to deny asylum by arguing that inadequate 
translation prejudicially affected his asylum hearing.14 In evaluating Perez-
Lastor’s appeal, the reviewing court found that Perez-Lastor’s answers to 
the BIA judge had been unresponsive and that the record indicated 
numerous occasions where Perez-Lastor “expressed difficulty 
understanding the translation.”15 The Perez-Lastor court noted that 
“[w]hile repeat questioning produced a superficially responsive answer on 
some occasions, it is by no means clear that Perez-Lastor actually 
understood what was asked of him.”16 Also, the Perez-Lastor court found 
its review further complicated by the fact that the court did not know what 
Perez-Lastor’s “actual testimony” was during the proceedings since “[n]o 
record of it was preserved.”17 Instead, the court could only evaluate Perez-
Lastor’s statements from a record revealing “the garble produced by the 
translator.”18 In deciding to reverse the BIA’s ruling, the Perez-Lastor 
court based its decision on the finding that a “better translation would have 
made a difference in the outcome of [Perez-Lastor’s deportation] 
hearing.”19  
Both Leung and Perez-Lastor illustrate how non-English-speaking 
defendants are entirely dependent on the work of court interpreters in 
American courtrooms. As seen in Leung, court interpreters play a 
particularly crucial role in the plea bargain context when a non-English-
 
 
 11. 208 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 12. Id. at 775. 
 13. Id. at 776 (quotation marks omitted). In response to Perez-Lastor’s complaints regarding the 
interpretation, the BIA judge asked that the Quiche interpreter and Perez-Lastor determine off the 
record whether they spoke the same dialect of Quiche. Id. At this point, the Quiche interpreter 
informed the BIA judge that Perez-Lastor could understand the interpretation if the interpreter spoke 
more slowly. Id. After accepting the Quiche interpreter’s statement, the BIA judge did not check on 
Perez-Lastor’s comprehension of the court proceedings again. Id.  
 14. Id. at 780.  
 15. Id. at 779.  
 16. Id. (italics omitted). 
 17. Id. at 782. 
 18. Id. The reviewing court reversed the BIA judge’s ruling and remanded Perez-Lastor’s case 
for a new asylum hearing. Id. at 783.  
 19. Id. at 780. According to the reviewing court, the BIA judge “disbelieved Perez-Lastor’s 
testimony because he could not communicate effectively at the hearing.” Id. at 781.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss2/4
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speaking defendant is asked to waive substantial constitutional rights.20 
Guilty pleas are now the standard method for resolving criminal 
controversies.21 At the very heart of the plea bargain is the defendant’s 
voluntary choice to plead guilty to avoid the expense, inconvenience, and 
risk of a trial.22 However, a defendant’s lack of English comprehension 
undermines the public’s confidence in the voluntary nature of a guilty 
plea.23 Federal courts should be concerned about a possibility that innocent 
non-English-speaking defendants are pleading guilty simply because they 
are thrown into a tumult of judicial proceedings in a foreign language.24 
Yet, non-English-speaking defendants plead guilty on a daily basis 
without adequate safeguards ensuring the voluntariness of their choice.25 
These non-English-speaking defendants face consequences as dire as 
deportation or imprisonment when they (perhaps unwittingly) waive their 
constitutional rights away in a cursory plea bargain.26 With the numbers of 
non-English-speaking individuals growing rapidly in the United States,27 
 
 
 20. Valencia v. United States is another similar case that addresses the issue of flawed or 
inadequate court interpretation during the plea bargain process. 923 F.2d 917, 922 n.5 (1st Cir. 1991). 
In this case, the defendant communicated with the judge through an interpreter and did not appear to 
recognize the charge against him. Id. at 921 n.4. The First Circuit also noticed that the defendant had 
“little familiarity with the American legal system” and had difficulty comprehending the term 
“statelessness,” an element of the charge against him. Id. at 921. Since the defendant did not 
understand the crucial elements of his charge and could not challenge the elements, the First Circuit 
remanded his case to the district court with directions to vacate the guilty plea. Id. at 922–23; see also 
Richard W. Cole & Laura Maslow-Armand, The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Addressing 
Foreign Language and Cultural Barriers at Different Stages of a Criminal Proceeding, 19 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 193, 211–12 (1997) (discussing Valencia as an example of language acting as a “barrier 
[] to a defendant’s knowing and intelligent participation in a plea bargain”).  
 21. Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial 
Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 229 (2006).  
 22. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747–48 (1970).  
 23. Public confidence in the plea bargain process will be undermined if there is a possibility that 
innocent individuals are pleading guilty. See F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea 
Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the 
Judge, 16 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 189, 197–99 (2002).  
 24. Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1151–55 
(1998). See also Alice J. Baker, A Model Statute to Provide Foreign-Language Interpreters in the 
Ohio Courts, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 593, 594 (1999). 
 25. See discussion infra Part III.B.  
 26. Sarah Keefe Molina, Comment, Rejecting the Collateral Consequences Doctrine: Silence 
About Deportation May or May Not Violate Strickland’s Performance Prong, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
267, 278 (2006). In the 2008 Presidential Campaign debates, the issue of linguistic discrimination in 
the courtroom was noted as an issue by the Presidential candidate, U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton. 
Senator Clinton commented: “I do not think that we should be in any way discriminating against 
people who do not speak English, who use facilities like hospitals or have to go to court to enforce 
their rights.” Hillary Clinton, United States Senator, Presidential Debate at the University of Texas, 
Austin (Feb. 21, 2008), available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/22/america/21textdem 
debate.php.  
 27. See discussion infra note 60.  
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the risk that non-English-speaking defendants are being substantially 
deprived of their rights in a speedy plea bargain is remarkably high.  
Due to the increasing numbers of diverse defendants in American 
courtrooms, this Note argues that new measures should be adopted by the 
federal courts to address the concern of court interpretation for non-
English-speaking defendants in the plea bargain process.28 Part I of this 
Note presents the framework of the plea bargaining process, which is a 
“process by which the prosecution and defense agree to a specific 
disposition of the criminal charges.”29 All plea bargains must meet a 
Brady30 threshold which requires that a guilty plea be voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent.31 Nevertheless, federal courts have no true guarantees that 
a non-English-speaking defendant’s plea agreement satisfies the Brady 
threshold because the court relies wholly on the work of a court 
interpreter.32 Likewise, the non-English-speaking defendant is entirely 
dependent upon the court interpreter who is his or her primary link to the 
judicial proceedings.33 This part lays the foundation for showing the 
importance of general compliance with the Court Interpreters Act when 
the non-English-speaking defendant waives constitutional rights through a 
plea bargain.  
Part II explores how the growing diversity of the United States impacts 
the federal judicial system and how it makes the issue of court 
interpretation in plea bargaining an area of significant concern. 
Specifically, increased linguistic and cultural diversity may make the 
circumstances seen in Leung and Perez-Lastor increasingly frequent. This 
 
 
 28. This Note exclusively discusses issues relating to court interpretation for plea bargains in the 
federal courts. At this time, state courts do not have uniform programs in place for court interpretation. 
However, several authors have proposed improved court interpreter programs on the individual state 
level. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 24; John R. Bowles, Note, Court Interpreters in Alabama State 
Courts: Present Perils, Practices, and Possibilities, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 619 (2008); Heather 
Pantoga, Injustice in Any Language: The Need for Improved Standards Governing Courtroom 
Interpretation in Wisconsin, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 601 (1999); Katherine Kerns Vesely, Note, ¿Cómo Se 
Dice “Qualified”?: Statutory Considerations in Improving the Standards and Practices of Court 
Interpreters in Kentucky, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 463 (2006).  
 29. Jason R. Marshall, Note, Two Standards of Competency Are Better Than One: Why Some 
Defendants Who Are Not Competent To Stand Trial Should Be Permitted To Plead Guilty, 37 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1181, 1213 (2004). Plea bargaining is dictated by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.  
 30. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).  
 31. Id.  
 32. In Perez-Lastor, the court noted that the record of the proceedings represented only the work 
of the interpreter. The defendant’s untranslated statements went unrecorded for later review. Perez-
Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 782 (9th Cir. 2000).  
 33. Michael B. Shulman, Note, No Hablo Inglés: Court Interpretation as a Major Obstacle to 
Fairness for Non-English Speaking Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REV. 175, 177 (1993). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss2/4
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part discusses the shortage of court interpreters equipped to handle this 
increasing linguistic diversity and provides background about the role of 
federal court interpreters under the Court Interpreter’s Act.  
Part III details the harms resulting from inadequate court interpretation 
during the plea bargain process. The harms resulting from inadequate 
courtroom interpretation for non-English-speaking defendants in the plea 
bargain process are both individualized and institutional. Inadequate 
courtroom interpretation produces individualized harms for the non-
English-speaking defendant because it implicates the individual’s 
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection and Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel.34 Similarly, inadequate court 
interpretation also harms the criminal justice system because it undermines 
public confidence in the fairness of the plea bargaining process.35  
Despite the critical nature that court interpretation plays in many 
criminal federal judicial proceedings, few procedural safeguards exist for 
ensuring accurate court interpretation even in the plea bargain process 
where the defendant relinquishes multiple constitutional rights.36 Part IV 
proposes multiple solutions that would provide necessary precautions for 
non-English-speaking defendants who plead guilty. The solutions for 
inadequate court interpretation in the plea bargain process range from 
adding personnel, to utilizing technological safeguards, to working with 
judge-based protections. Implementing these solutions will help to avoid 
the daunting circumstances that Leung and Chin faced when they 
bargained away their constitutional rights in both an unfamiliar language 
and judicial system.37  
 
 
 34. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 35. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 36. For example, the court has total discretion in determining whether to appoint a court 
interpreter to aid the defendant in communicating with counsel and the court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 28. 
Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically states: “The court may select, appoint, 
and set the reasonable compensation for an interpreter. The compensation must be paid from funds 
provided by law or by the government, as the court may direct.” Id.  
 37. This Note primarily focuses upon improving the plea colloquy that takes place between the 
non-English-speaking defendant and the federal judge. Yet, the problem of language interpretation is 
not limited merely to the plea colloquy but also extends to all negotiations and discussions leading up 
to the plea colloquy. During this early stage, the non-English-speaking defendant may be in an 
impaired negotiating position because of the lack of accurate language interpretation during 
communications with defense counsel. Daniel J. Rearick, Reaching Out to the Most Insular 
Minorities: A Proposal for Improving Latino Access to the American Legal System, 39 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 543, 573 (2004). Although many of the remedies discussed in the Note address the plea 
colloquy, many of these proposals may also be implemented in the plea negotiation stage.  
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450 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:445 
 
 
 
 
I. THE PLEA BARGAIN PROCESS  
Plea bargaining is the typical way criminal cases are disposed of by the 
federal judiciary.38 In 2006, United States courts reported that eighty-seven 
percent of criminal defendants pled guilty.39 The effect of plea bargaining 
on the immigrant and non-English-speaking populations within the federal 
court system is staggering. In 2006, there were 18,055 defendants charged 
with immigration offenses, of which 17,328 pled guilty.40  
A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the constitutional rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, right to a trial by jury, and the right to 
confront one’s accusers.41 The standards for all plea bargains are dictated 
by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
and the U.S. Constitution. Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Brady 
standard controls the validity of the plea bargain. It requires that a plea 
bargain is “voluntary . . . knowing, intelligent . . . [and] done with 
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences.”42  
 
 
 38. Langer, supra note 21, at 229. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the benefits of the 
plea bargaining process:  
(1) The criminal case is resolved expeditiously; (2) defendants avoid the unproductive and 
negative effects of incarceration that may occur when bail is denied or is set too high; (3) 
society is protected from defendants who may commit crimes while released on bail; (4) 
handing down prison sentences soon after a defendant is charged with a crime increases the 
probability that the criminal will be rehabilitated; and (5) the resources that are saved by 
avoiding trial reduce the drain on state and federal judges and courthouses.  
Marshall, supra note 29, at 1213 (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260–61 (1971)).  
 The Supreme Court also stated in Brady that “[i]t is this mutuality of advantage that perhaps 
explains the fact that at present well over three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this country rest 
on pleas of guilty.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). Furthermore, defendants face a 
number of risks in participating in a trial including: a prosecutorial, adversarial system, prosecutorial 
discretion in charging, inability to compel private or public prosecutions, and the “harshness of 
American criminal penalties.” Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in 
United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. Supp. 717, 718 (2006).  
 39. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 24 tbl.D-4 (2006) 
(showing criminal statistics for a 12 month period). According to the U.S. courts, this percentage 
represents 76,610 individual criminal defendants who were disposed of by way of a guilty plea. Id. 
The U.S. courts also report that, in the same period, there were 87,985 criminal defendants. Id.  
 40. Id. at 251. 
 41. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1968). 
 42. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. In evaluating whether a plea bargain is “voluntary,” the Brady court 
looked to all of the “relevant circumstances.” Id. at 749. Moreover, the Court explained that 
“voluntariness in pleading guilty . . . would be presumed in the absence of coercion.” Daniel P. Blank, 
Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and 
Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2018 (2000). However, the Brady Court recognized that the 
prosecution will “encourage pleas of guilty at every important step in the criminal process” and this 
type of encouragement is not coercion. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750. In elaborating the standard of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss2/4
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The plea bargaining process generally follows a well-established path. 
After a defendant has been arraigned, the plea bargaining process can 
begin.43 At this time, the defense counsel44 and prosecutor will start 
discussing the terms of a potential plea agreement. However, the court is 
prohibited from participating in these discussions.45 In a plea bargain, the 
defendant has the option of pleading guilty or pleading nolo contendere.46 
Defendants are motivated to plea bargain because they can potentially 
plead to a lesser or related offense in exchange for a prosecutor’s promise 
to “not bring” or “move to dismiss” other charges.47 In exchange, the 
 
 
“knowing,” the Brady court requires the defendant to be “fully aware of the direct consequences, 
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel.” Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957)). However, 
the Brady standard of voluntariness is limited. For example, even if the prosecution fails to provide 
exculpatory evidence to the defendant prior to the guilty plea, the Supreme Court has considered the 
guilty plea to be voluntary. Ross, supra note 38, at 719–20. See generally Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 
3–22 (2002) (discussing different approaches to determining whether a plea bargain met the Brady 
standard).  
 43. A prosecutor can be motivated to pursue plea bargains because “he is able to handle more 
cases; conviction rates soar; and most importantly, more criminals . . . are more quickly removed from 
the streets.” Hessick, supra note 23, at 191–92. A prosecutor’s own career can be boosted with ensured 
convictions, higher conviction rates, and increased public confidence in the criminal justice system. Id. 
at 192; see also Ross, supra note 38, at 717 (explaining that plea bargains help prosecutors dispose of 
cases efficiently, maintain control over caseloads, and avoid the risk of acquittal).  
 Similarly, public defenders are motivated to participate in plea bargains based on the sheer 
volume of their caseloads. Hessick, supra note 23, at 209. As salaried employees of the government, a 
public defender’s “income does not depend on the number of cases they quickly dispose of; rather, 
their job depends upon managing an overwhelming number of cases every year.” Id. In addition, 
public defenders also “feel[] pressure from prosecutors, judges, and court clerks to move cases quickly 
to resolution.” Id. at 210. By suggesting a client go to trial, a public defender also runs the risk that the 
trial’s outcome will be more harsh than the punishment specified in an agreed-upon plea bargain. Id. at 
211. In fact, both the prosecution and the defense counsel are “often encouraged to enter into plea 
negotiations for no other reason than that they have longstanding bargaining relationships.” Id. at 219.  
 44. If the defendant is appearing pro se, the defendant will personally engage in the plea 
negotiations. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 45. While the court cannot participate in the plea bargains, the court can encourage the use of 
plea bargains. Hessick, supra note 23, at 210. For example, a judge can “threaten to punish defendants 
more harshly if a case goes to trial” or “make sure that the attorney [defense counsel] is forced to wait 
next time he needs something from the clerk or judge.” Id. The court may be motivated to take such 
actions because a judge can protect his or her reputation by reducing the risk of reversible error. Id. at 
226. Additionally, like prosecutors and public defenders, judges also favor plea bargains because it 
reduces their overall caseload in an efficient manner. Id. at 227.  
 46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1). The defendant may decide to plead nolo contendere (no contest 
plea), which the Supreme Court has understood as an “admission of guilt for the purposes of this 
case.” Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 426 (1961) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 
455 (1926)).  
 47. For a defendant, the decision to enter a guilty plea is “heavily influenced by the defendant’s 
appraisal of the prosecution’s case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency 
should a guilty plea be offered and accepted.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 756. In advising the defendant, the 
defense counsel must “communicat[e] his assessment of the strength of the prosecution’s case, the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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prosecution may promise to “recommend” or “not . . . oppose the 
defendant’s request” for a “particular sentence or sentencing range” or 
come to an agreement with the defense attorney for a “specific sentence or 
sentencing range.”48  
Once the prosecution and the defense have agreed upon a plea bargain, 
the plea bargain must be “disclose[d] . . . in open court.”49 However, the 
defendant can withdraw his guilty plea for any reason before the plea is 
accepted by the court.50 At this juncture, the court is responsible for 
determining whether the guilty plea meets constitutional muster.51 Once 
the defendant has been placed under oath, the court “must address the 
defendant personally in open court” to “inform the defendant of, and 
determine that the defendant understands” the function and effect of the 
plea agreement on the defendant’s constitutional rights.52 In this plea 
 
 
applicable issues of law, and the possible legal alternatives.” Hessick, supra note 23, at 218. In 
suggesting clients pursue a plea bargain, the defense counsel runs the risk of “fail[ing] to pursue 
information that they need to maximize their clients’ position” or miscalculating the strength of the 
prosecution’s case. Zacharias, supra note 24, at 1165.  
 48. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). In these plea bargain negotiations, the prosecutor has the balance 
of power in controlling the terms of the plea bargain. Christopher P. Siegle, Note, United States v. 
Mezzanatto: Effectively Denying Yet Another Procedural Safeguard to “Innocent” Defendants, 32 
TULSA L.J. 119, 133–38 (1996). Instances of this unequal power balance include: the prosecutor’s 
ability to “bluff” the defendant and the option of requiring a defendant to waive future protections 
against the use of his or her statements during the current plea negotiations. Id.  
 49. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2). 
 50. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(1). 
 51. Hessick, supra note 23, at 224–25. The court can also reject a plea bargain “if it is contrary to 
‘the interest of the public in the effective administration of criminal justice.’” Abraham S. Goldstein, 
Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the Public Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567, 571 
(1996) (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, 
§§ 1.8(a), 3.3(c) (1968). For a plea bargain to “violate the public interest,” the plea bargain must be 
“(1) . . . unfair to the defendant; (2) . . . involve[] an abuse of prosecutorial discretion; or (3) . . . 
infringe[] seriously on the judge’s sentencing domain without serving a countervailing prosecutorial 
purpose.” Id. at 571–72. In this respect, the judge acts as the final review of the plea bargain’s 
appropriateness. Id. at 571.  
 52. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). The Judicial Benchbook for federal district judges also provides a 
guideline for questions that a judge should ask a defendant during a plea colloquy. The following is an 
excerpt from the Judicial Benchbook for the taking of pleas:  
 Ask the defendant: 
1. Do you understand that you are now under oath and if you answer any of my questions 
falsely, your answers may later be used against you in another prosecution for perjury or 
making a false statement? [See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(A) [formerly 11(c)(5).]] 
2. What is your full name? 
3. How old are you? 
4. How far did you go in school? 
5. Have you been treated recently for any mental illness or addiction to narcotic drugs of any 
kind? . . .  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss2/4
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colloquy, the court must ensure that the defendant understands the “nature 
of each charge to which the defendant is pleading” and associated 
penalties.53 The court is also required to find that the guilty plea is 
voluntary according to the Brady standards,54 and that the plea has a 
factual basis.55 After a defendant’s plea has been accepted by the court, the 
defendant can only withdraw the plea if “the defendant can show a fair and 
just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”56 This plea colloquy between 
 
 
6. Are you currently under the influence of any drug, medication, or alcoholic beverage of 
any kind? . . . 
7. Have you received a copy of the indictment (information) pending against you—that is, the 
written charges made against you in this case—and have you fully discussed those charges, 
and the case in general, with Mr./Ms. __________ as your counsel? 
8. Are you fully satisfied with the counsel, representation, and advice given to you in this case 
by your attorney, Mr./Ms. __________? 
E. If there is a plea agreement of any kind, ask the defendant: 
. . . 
2. Does the plea agreement represent in its entirety any understanding you have with the 
government? 
3. Do you understand the terms of the plea agreement? 
4. Has anyone made any promise or assurance that is not in the plea agreement to persuade 
you to accept this agreement? Has anyone threatened you in any way to persuade you to 
accept this agreement? . . .  
 M. Ask the defendant: 
1. Do you understand 
(a) that you have a right to plead not guilty to any offense charged against you and to persist 
in that plea; 
(b) that you would then have the right to a trial by jury; 
(c) that at trial you would be presumed to be innocent and the government would have to 
prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 
(d) that you would have the right to the assistance of counsel for your defense—appointed by 
the court if necessary—at trial and every other stage of the proceeding, the right to see and 
hear all the witnesses and have them cross-examined in your defense, the right on your own 
part to decline to testify unless you voluntarily elected to do so in your own defense, and the 
right to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify in your defense?  
Do you understand that should you decide not to testify or put on any evidence, these facts 
cannot be used against you? 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 73–78 (5th ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter BENCHBOOK] (footnotes omitted). 
 53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).  
 54. The plea bargain must “not result from force, threats, or promises.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 
11(b)(2); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970). 
 55. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).  
 56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d). The Supreme Court prohibits a defendant from withdrawing his or 
her guilty plea merely because he or she “misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely 
penalties attached to alternative courses of action.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 757. In addition, a criminal 
defendant cannot attack a guilty plea “even if the defendant was not advised of every potential 
constitutional claim or defense.” Blank, supra note 42, at 2025. The Supreme Court further clarified in 
McMann v. Richardson that when a defendant is weighing the decision whether or not to plead guilty 
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the court and the defendant is the final check before the defendant 
relinquishes multiple constitutional rights and faces consequences as 
serious as deportation or imprisonment.57 In practice, this entire plea 
bargain process occurs in a compressed period of time.58  
II. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROLE OF 
THE COURT INTERPRETER 
A. Growing Diversity within the United States and the American Judicial 
System 
Increasing numbers of non-English-speaking defendants are caught in 
the whirlwind of the plea bargain process. Since the passage of the Court 
Interpreters Act59 in 1978, the population of the United States continues to 
diversify.60 This greater diversity has largely stemmed from the rising 
numbers of immigrants entering the United States.61 Coupled with the 
growth of the immigrant population are increased language barrier 
concerns. For example, in Census 2000, 24.1 million individuals in the 
United States indicated a difficulty with speaking and understanding the 
English language.62 Of this number, more than 11.9 million indicated that 
they were “linguistically isolated.”63 In addition, more than two thousand 
 
 
that this decision “must necessarily rest upon counsel’s answers, uncertain as they may be.” McMann 
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970). Thus, a defendant, in deciding to plead guilty, must accept 
the risk that the defense counsel is “mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court’s judgment 
might be on given facts.” Id. Moreover, as long as the “decision to plead is ‘based on reasonably 
competent advice’ of counsel,” then the plea meets the Brady voluntariness threshold. Blank, supra 
note 42, at 2020 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 770).  
 57. Goldstein, supra note 51, at 571.  
 58. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398–99 (1993).  
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2000). 
 60. The Act was passed by Congress in 1978. Mollie M. Pawlosky, Case Note, When Justice is 
Lost in the “Translation”: Gonzalez v. United States, An “Interpretation” of the Court Interpreters 
Act of 1978, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 444–45 (1996). In 1980, the foreign-born population was 
approximately fourteen million individuals. U.S. Census Bureau, Table 14: Foreign-Born Population 
by Historical Section and Subsection of the United States: 1850 to 1990, http://www.census.gov/ 
population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab14.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2008). By Census 2000, the 
foreign-born population had more than doubled and even these numbers are now almost ten years out 
of date. NOLAN MALONE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE 
FOREIGN BORN POPULATION: 2000, at 2 (2003).  
 61. Between the 1990 U.S. Census and the 2000 U.S. Census, the foreign-born population grew 
by fifty-seven percent, which is an increase from 19,800,000 to 31,100,000 individuals. Of this 
population, fifty-two percent were born in Latin America and twenty-six percent were born in Asia. 
MALONE ET AL., supra note 60, at 2.  
 62. Lynn W. Davis et al., The Changing Face of Justice: A Survey of Recent Cases Involving 
Courtroom Interpretation, 7 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).  
 63. HYON B. SHIN & ROSALIND BRUNO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
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unique languages were identified by Census 2000 within the United 
States.64  
This growing tide of diversity has spilled into federal judicial 
proceedings. Between 2002 and 2006, the federal courts recorded a thirty 
percent increase in immigration filings.65 In 2006, seventy-two percent of 
all immigration cases constituted “improper reentry by an alien,” which 
involves defendants unlikely to have fluency in English.66 These Census 
2000 statistics and immigration filing percentages indicate the mounting 
need for the United States courts to provide adequate court interpretation 
services for non-English-speaking individuals who enter the American 
criminal justice system.67  
The shortage of both certified and “otherwise qualified” interpreters is 
striking in light of the increased number of criminal defendants who 
require the use of a court interpreter.68 In 2006 alone, the United States 
 
 
COMMERCE, LANGUAGE USE AND ENGLISH-SPEAKING ABILITY 10 (2003). The term linguistic 
isolation is defined by Census 2000 as: 
A linguistically isolated household is one in which no person age 14 or over speaks English at 
least “Very well.” That is, no person aged 14 or over speaks only English at home, or speaks 
another language at home and speaks English “Very well.”  
A linguistically isolated person is any person living in a linguistically isolated household. All 
the members of a linguistically isolated household are tabulated as linguistically isolated, 
including members under 14 years old who may speak only English.  
Id. Census 2000 recognized the impact of linguistic isolation and noted that: 
In the United States, the ability to speak English plays a large role in how well people can 
perform daily activities. How well a person speaks English may indicate how well he or she 
communicates with public officials, medical personnel, and other service providers. It could 
also affect other activities outside the home, such as grocery shopping or banking.  
Id. at 9–10.  
 Census 2000 also conducted a geographic breakdown of the language demographics in the United 
States and found that fourteen percent of people over five years of age in the Western region of the 
United States did not speak English “Very well.” Id. at 5 tbl.2. Other regions that showed large 
percentages of individuals who did not speak English “Very well” include: nine percent of people in 
the Northeast and seven percent in the South. Id.  
 64. Davis et al., supra note 62, at 4.  
 65. DUFF, supra note 39, at 27.  
 66. Id. at 25.  
 67. See also Erik Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting after the Largest ICE Raid in US History: A 
Personal Account (June 13, 2008), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/07/14/ 
opinion/14ed-camayd.pdf (describing a federal court interpreter’s experience as an interpreter in one of 
the largest immigration raids in the United States, which involved the plea bargains of hundreds of 
non-English-speaking defendants); Julia Preston, An Interpreter Speaking up for Migrants, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 11, 2008, at A1 (highlighting the concern that non-English-speaking defendants are not 
being afforded the same constitutional protections in the plea bargain process by recounting Professor 
Camayd-Freixas’s experience as a federally certified interpreter).  
 68. Even with the passage of the Court Interpreters Act and other pushes by the government to 
increase numbers of court interpreters, “the demand for court interpreters remains much greater than 
the current supply of officially certified interpreters.” Davis et al., supra note 62, at 14–15. At the very 
least, this shortage has forced many courts to use “skilled non-certified interpreters on a regular basis.” 
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district courts reported the use of court interpreters in 210,336 events.69 
This need for court interpreters has expanded beyond the district court 
level to federal appellate courts, which now have caseloads necessitating 
greater use of court interpreters.70  
B. How Existing Institutions Address this Growing Diversity of 
Defendants 
Congress initially enacted the Court Interpreters Act to ensure the 
ability of the defendant to communicate with counsel and the court, as 
well as to make certain that the non-English-speaking defendant could 
understand questions directed at him or her during the judicial 
proceedings.71 The Act calls for the Director of the Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts to establish the federal certification program 
for interpreters, prescribe the qualifications necessary for certification, 
determine who meets the certification standards, and certify those 
individuals who meet the rigors of the certification program.72 Compliance 
with the Act by the federal judiciary is compulsory.73  
 
 
Id. at 15. However, at the very worst, this shortage has led to “the widespread use of unqualified and 
incompetent individuals as interpreters.” Beth Gottesman Lindie, Inadequate Interpreting Services in 
Courts and the Rules of Admissibility of Testimony on Extrajudicial Interpretations, 48 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 399, 410 (1993). The Mosquera court also described the problem:  
The interpretation problem is far more pervasive than court records indicate. In many 
instances when interpreters are not available, conversations between counsel and client or 
defendant and government or court personnel take place in halting English, or in the case of a 
few attorneys who are fluent in a foreign language, in the foreign language. Sometimes 
relatives or friends of defendants or privately retained interpreters are relied upon outside the 
courtroom.  
United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).  
 69. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR: ACTIVITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 27 (2006).  
 70. Davis et al., supra note 62, at 5.  
 71. Pawlosky, supra note 60, at 445. The “original impetus” for passage of the Court Interpreters 
Act was the decision in United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970). In this 
decision, the Second Circuit “held that the Sixth Amendment . . . requires that non-English[-]speaking 
defendants be informed of their right to simultaneous interpretation of proceedings at [federal] 
government expense.” H.R. REP. NO. 95–1687, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652, 
4653. Furthermore, testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights demonstrated that “several federal convictions have been reversed on due 
process grounds where no interpreter had been appointed and where the defendant’s knowledge of 
English was either minimal or nonexistent.” Id. at 25.  
 72. Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(a)-(b) (2000). In addition to establishing the 
certification program, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts also 
maintains the master list of federally certified interpreters. § 1827(b)(3). 
 73. United States v. Gonzales, 339 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2003).  
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During judicial proceedings, the Act places on the court an affirmative 
duty to determine whether a defendant understands the courtroom 
proceedings.74 Once the court finds that the defendant is in need of a court 
interpreter, the clerk of the court is responsible for securing the services of 
a certified interpreter.75 Federal appellate courts give great deference to the 
United States district courts’ exercise of this discretion in selecting a 
competent court interpreter.76  
Under the Act, there are two categories of court interpreters: federally 
certified interpreters and “otherwise qualified” interpreters.77 At this time, 
the federal certification program of courtroom interpreters established 
under the Act is available in a limited number of languages.78 The goals of 
the federal certification program are to find interpreters with a strong 
vocabulary, interpreting skill, and understanding of the court’s style and 
tone.79 As such, the federal certification program includes an oral and 
written exam in English and the tested language.80  
The second category of interpreters are those who are “otherwise 
qualified.” If a federally certified interpreter is not reasonably available 
either in the language needed or at the time of the judicial proceedings, the 
 
 
 74. Pawlosky, supra note 60, at 445. 
 75. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(c)(2). Individuals, other than witnesses, may waive their right to an 
interpreter. § 1827(f)(1). According to the Act, the court interpreter secured by the clerk of the court 
must provide for a simultaneous translation of the courtroom proceedings to the defendant. § 1827(k).  
 76. See United States v. Paz, 981 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that “a district court 
is given wide discretion in matters regarding the selection of a court interpreter . . . [and] [s]uch 
decisions will not be overturned unless the district court abused its discretion”); Gonzales, 339 F.3d at 
727 ( “It is well settled that ‘[t]he appointment of an interpreter lies within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge.’”) (quoting United States v. Coronel-Quintana, 752 F.2d 1284, 1291 (8th Cir. 1985)). If a 
defendant chooses to waive a court interpreter, courts are required by the Court Interpreters Act to 
make “certain findings on the record” to show that declining to provide a court interpreter was not 
“fundamentally unfair.” United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209–10 (5th Cir. 1980); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1827(f)(1). 
 77. § 1827(a).  
 78. Shulman, supra note 33, at 180.  
 79. Lindie, supra note 68, at 409. According to the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters 
& Translators, a court interpreter “should be expected to provide competent simultaneous and 
consecutive interpreting and sight translation of documents.” NAT’L ASS’N OF JUDICIARY 
INTERPRETERS & TRANSLATORS, EIGHT POSITION PAPERS 13 (2006).  
 80. Kelly Kaiser, A Lawyer’s Guide: How to Avoid Pitfalls When Dealing With Alien Clients, 86 
KY. L.J. 1183, 1200 (1998). The Federal Court Interpreter Certification Examination consists of both a 
written and oral portion. The written portion of the exam “tests the candidate’s reading 
comprehension, language usage, proficiency at sentence completion and knowledge of antonyms and 
synonyms.” Pawlosky, supra note 60, at 468–69. A candidate can pass the exam with an eighty 
percent score. Kaiser, supra, at 1200. After the written portion has been completed, the candidate is 
tested orally. The oral portion of the exam is “conducted in a simulated courtroom and tests the 
candidate’s use of formal language, slang, and colloquialisms.” Pawlosky, supra note 60, at 469. Each 
candidate is reviewed by a “panel consisting of an active court interpreter, a specialist in the . . . 
language, and an international conference interpreter.” Id. at 470.  
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district court may select an “otherwise qualified interpreter.”81 
Certification of “otherwise qualified” interpreters is accomplished through 
professional associations or through private companies contracting out the 
services of courtroom interpreters.82 In the period from 2005–06, the 
National Court Interpreter Database recorded an increase of six hundred 
new “otherwise qualified interpreters,” but this number of additional 
interpreters is insufficient in light of the federal caseload requiring 
interpretation.83 This present shortage of certified and qualified court 
interpreters harms non-English-speaking defendants who choose to plead 
guilty because these defendants may have unskilled court interpreters 
performing interpretation during plea negotiations.  
C. The Present Shortage of Court Interpreters  
Despite these growing numbers of cases requiring court interpretation, 
United States courts reported the availability of only 960 federally 
certified interpreters in 2006.84 Unfortunately, the number of individuals 
passing the federal certification exam annually is also correspondingly 
low.85 For example, in 2006, only eighty-one individuals passed the 
Spanish interpreters certification exam.86 This scant number is partly due 
 
 
 81. Paz, 981 F.2d at 200.  
 82. NAT’L ASS’N OF JUDICIARY INTERPRETERS & TRANSLATORS, supra note 79, at 16–17. 
However, use of “otherwise qualified interpreters” has raised concerns. In Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit 
commented that the trial court’s use of non-certified interpreters was “troubling.” United States v. 
Gonzales, 339 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Circuit also observed that the circuit even 
used uncertified interpreters in about sixty percent of Spanish-English interpretations. Id.  
 83. DUFF, supra note 69, at 28. Moreover, the shortage does not only affect certified interpreters, 
but also “otherwise qualified” interpreters. Part of the problem arises from the fact that there are “few 
institutions of higher education that extensively train and certify interpreters and that agencies 
providing interpreting services lack quality control mechanisms.” Lindie, supra note 68, at 410.  
 84. DUFF, supra note 69, at 27.  
 85. Pawlosky, supra note 60, at 470 (explaining that the “small number of candidates that 
actually pass the examination” may be a result of the federal government’s failure to provide training 
programs and the level of difficulty of the exam).  
 86. DUFF, supra note 69, at 27. Census 2000 documented more than 28.1 million Spanish 
speakers in the United States. SHIN & BRUNO, supra note 63, at 2. Of that number, approximately 13.8 
million reported that they spoke English “less than very well.” Id. According to Census 2000, the 
number of Spanish speakers grew by sixty percent from the decade between 1990 and 2000. Id. at 3.  
 The federal certification program is extremely rigorous due to the challenging nature of accurately 
interpreting idioms, slang, tone, and dialect. See Lindie, supra note 68, at 416–18 (describing the 
obstacles that interpreters face in providing an accurate translation, including words with multiple 
meanings and variations in dialect); Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across 
Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1036–37 (2007) (explaining the difficulty in checking 
accuracy of interpretation and the need to adjust for nonlinguistic clues in understanding the meaning 
of words). Even at a moderate rate of speech, the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and 
Translators notes that accurate and consistent interpretation is “relatively difficult” because “memory, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss2/4
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to the fact that federal certification is available only for three languages: 
Spanish, Navajo, and Haitian-Creole.87 Meanwhile, 111 languages 
required interpretation in the federal court system in just 2006.88 As a 
result, non-English-speaking defendants who require interpretation of a 
language other than those three languages rely on the National Court 
Interpreter Database to refer “otherwise qualified” interpreters for their 
judicial proceedings.89 Despite the need, there were only 2,475 otherwise 
qualified interpreters for 168 languages in 2006, according to the National 
Court Interpreter Database.90  
 
 
speed, mental flexibility, patience, and many cognitive skills come into play.” NAT’L ASS’N OF 
JUDICIARY INTERPRETERS & TRANSLATORS, supra note 79, at 16.  
 The shortage of court interpreters even plagues major metropolitan areas like New York City, 
where the Mosquera court once noted that there were only a “handful of reliable Chinese interpreters.” 
United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Overall, “courts are faced with a 
severe shortage of qualified interpreters to handle this increasing multilingual caseload.” Id. at 171. 
Additionally, the shortage of court interpreters is further compounded by the fact that interpreters do 
not interpret at the same level, which can lead to problems of inconsistent interpretation. See Ahmad, 
supra note 86, at 1008. 
 87. Shulman, supra note 33, at 180.  
 88. DUFF, supra note 69, at 27. The languages with the highest frequency of interpretation 
include: Spanish, Mandarin, Vietnamese, Arabic, Korean, Cantonese, Russian, Portuguese, Haitian 
Creole, and Punjabi. Id. Census 2000 documented dramatic increases in the numbers of Chinese, 
Vietnamese, and Russian speakers in the decade from 1990 to 2000. SHIN & BRUNO, supra note 63, at 
3. According to the Census, Chinese speakers “jumped from the fifth to the second most widely 
spoken non-English language, as the number of Chinese speakers rose from 1.2 million to 2.0 million 
people.” Id. Moreover, Vietnamese speakers doubled in number and Russian speakers nearly tripled in 
number during the decade. Id.  
 89. The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts “shall provide 
guidelines to the courts for the selection of otherwise qualified interpreters, in order to ensure that the 
highest standards of accuracy are maintained in all judicial proceedings subject to the provisions” of 
the Court Interpreters Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b)(2) (2000). The federal courts divide “otherwise 
qualified” interpreters into two categories of “professionally qualified” and “language skilled.” U.S. 
Courts, Three Categories of Interpreters, http://www.uscourts.gov/interpretprog/categories.html (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2008). To be considered as “professionally qualified,” the interpreter must satisfy a 
number of rigorous standards including prior existing employment as an interpreter for the State 
Department, United Nations, or other similarly related agency. Id. For an individual to be considered 
as “language skilled,” the interpreter must show to the court the ability to interpret court proceedings. 
Id.  
 90. DUFF, supra note 69, at 27–28. If certified or otherwise qualified interpreters are not 
available, the courts can provide for a Telephone Interpreting Program (TIP). Id. at 28. The TIP is 
made available to the Courts where court interpreters are not cost-effective for use. United States v. 
Gonzales, 339 F.3d 725, 728–29 (8th Cir. 2003). In fiscal year 2006, the TIP was used “in 3,770 
events in 47 languages, with Spanish used for 91 percent of events.” DUFF, supra note 69, at 27.  
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III. THE IMPACT OF COURT INTERPRETATION UPON THE PLEA BARGAIN 
PROCESS 
The impact of inadequate court interpretation permeates the entire 
judicial system, but its impact on plea bargains is particularly severe. The 
Constitution guarantees non-English-speaking defendants equal standing 
as fluent English speakers in the American judicial system.91 Yet, the 
present judicial system provides few meaningful safeguards to ensure the 
quality and accuracy of the interpretation received by a non-English-
speaking defendants in the judicial process.92 As a result, inadequate court 
interpretation not only violates the non-English-speaking defendant’s 
constitutional rights but also undermines confidence in the practice of plea 
bargaining.93  
A. Non-English-Speaking Defendants Are Afforded Constitutional 
Protections 
Due to the increased use of plea bargaining and the rising numbers of 
non-English-speaking defendants, federal courts face the growing 
possibility that plea bargains may not be meeting constitutionally required 
standards of voluntariness due to inadequate court interpretation. 
Specifically, a non-English-speaking defendant’s rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Effective 
Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment are the rights most 
likely to be violated when inadequate court interpretation occurs. 
Although courts have discretion in determining whether or not to provide 
an interpreter under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 28(b),94 the rule 
does not require that defendants be informed of their right to a court-
appointed interpreter, even if the defendant does not have the ability to pay 
for these services.95 Nonetheless, the presence of a court interpreter is 
essential where the non-English-speaking defendant intends to plea 
bargain—a precarious position if the court does not adequately convey the 
meaning and significance of the guilty plea.  
Since the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees the equal protection of United States laws to any person within 
 
 
 91. See discussion infra Part III.A.  
 92. See discussion infra Part III.B.  
 93. See discussion infra Part III.C.  
 94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 28(b). 
 95. Virginia E. Hench, What Kind of Hearing? Some Thoughts on Due Process for the Non-
English-Speaking Criminal Defendant, 24 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 251, 258 (1999). 
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U.S. jurisdiction,96 non-English-speaking defendants should not be harmed 
in the judicial system because they cannot fully comprehend the 
significance and consequences of the judicial proceedings.97 If the Equal 
Protection Clause is read according to its plain language, a defendant’s 
immigration status or language ability should not be a detriment to the 
defendant during court proceedings while within the jurisdiction of the 
United States.98 Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause extends to all 
guilty pleas,99 including the guilty pleas of non-English-speaking 
defendants.100 As such, courts must guarantee that the non-English-
speaking defendant is on equal footing as any other citizen, naturalized 
citizen, or English-speaking defendant during the plea bargain process.101 
Thus, to protect a non-English-speaking defendant’s equal protection 
rights, courts are required to assure that the court interpretation sufficiently 
conveys the meaning of the plea bargain according to the standards set by 
Brady.102  
Inadequate court interpretation of a guilty plea can also impact a non-
English-speaking defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. Under the Sixth Amendment, the accused has the 
right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”103 If a non-
English-speaking defendant and the defense counsel are unable to 
communicate due to language barriers, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel is violated.104 Furthermore, a 
 
 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 97. See discussion infra Part III.C.  
 98. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 99. Brian R. Shipley & Kimberlee A. Cleaveland, Guilty Pleas, 87 GEO. L.J. 1433, 1433 (1999); 
see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (stating that a prosecutor is prohibited from 
offering a plea bargain “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or 
other arbitrary classification” (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).  
 100. See Kaiser, supra note 80, at 1189–90 (discussing the impact of guilty pleas on non-English-
speaking defendants and the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel); Molina, supra note 26, at 
269–70 (mentioning the immigration consequences of guilty pleas on immigrant defendants); Cole & 
Maslow-Armand, supra note 20, at 211–13 (examining the impact of court interpretation on plea 
bargains for non-English-speaking defendants in both the state and federal context).  
 101. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (holding that the “term ‘person’ in this 
context encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the United States and 
entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they reside”); 
see also Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigrant Regulation, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 567, 622 n.240 (2008) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause guards against states 
discriminating against aliens but states can impose some restrictions regarding alien access to state 
benefits).  
 102. See discussion supra Part I. 
 103. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 104. To assist defense counsel in effective representation, a defendant has the right to “participate 
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defendant’s Sixth Amendment right is infringed upon if the defense 
counsel fails to object to the inadequacy of interpretation at trial. To 
determine whether defense counsel was ineffective during the plea bargain 
process, the courts have applied the Strickland standard.105 Under the 
Strickland standard, the court will evaluate whether the counsel’s advice to 
the defendant was “objectively unreasonable” and “that, but for counsel’s 
errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.”106 Application of the Strickland standard is 
detrimental to the non-English-speaking defendant because “it creates a 
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the range of 
competent and reasonable professional assistance.”107 Therefore, the 
Strickland standard makes it difficult for a defendant to show that the 
ineffectiveness of counsel is a reversible error.  
B. Insufficient Checks Exist to Determine the Accuracy of Court 
Interpretation 
Inadequate guidelines for federal judges, scarcity of interpreters for 
most languages, and a lack of precautionary checks in courtrooms create 
serious problems in verifying the accuracy of court interpretation. The 
most guidance a federal district judge receives regarding taking pleas from 
non-English-speaking defendants is a brief passage from the Judicial 
Benchbook:  
Taking pleas from defendants who do not speak English raises 
problems beyond the obvious language barrier. Judges should be 
mindful not only of the need to avoid using legalisms and other 
 
 
in his own defense.” Kaiser, supra note 80, at 1203. However, this participation “is impossible when a 
language barrier exists between the attorney and client and there is no one available to bridge the 
interpretation gap.” Id. Under these circumstances, the language barrier prevents the defense attorney 
and defendant from forming the best defense possible, which violates the Sixth Amendment. See 
United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 390–91 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding that the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated when the Spanish-speaking 
defendant could not communicate with defense counsel and did not participate in his own defense); cf. 
Gallo-Vasquez v. United States, 402 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that there was no Sixth 
Amendment violation when defendant could understand some English, could translate some phrases 
on his own, and did not raise the language barrier issue to the court). 
 105. Molina, supra note 26, at 273–74.  
 106. Id. at 274; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 694 (1984) (“An error by 
counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal 
proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. . . . The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”).  
 107. Kaiser, supra note 80, at 1190. 
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terms that interpreters may have difficulty translating, but also of 
the need to explain such concepts as the right not to testify and the 
right to question witnesses, which may not be familiar to persons 
from different cultures.108 
This lone passage is the only reference available for federal district 
judges regarding the acceptance of guilty pleas from non-English-speaking 
defendants.109 The Judicial Benchbook does not provide any examples of 
possible lines of questioning for a non-English-speaking defendant during 
the plea colloquy.110  
In addition, courts frequently cannot rely on the availability of 
federally certified court interpreters during the plea bargain process 
because federal certification is limited to only three languages.111 While 
federal certification requires an extensive written and oral examination and 
a simulated court proceeding, the certification process for “otherwise 
qualified” court interpreters can be conducted entirely by professional 
associations and private companies.112 Unfortunately, the certification 
processes by these professional associations are not uniform, partly due to 
the lack of incentive to limit the number of qualified interpreters available 
for contracting by private companies.113 As such, court interpreters for 
frequently interpreted languages, such as Mandarin and Arabic, may have 
not undergone the same rigorous testing as federally certified court 
interpreters.114  
Within the courtroom, few checks exist to ensure that the court 
interpretation is meeting the level of accuracy and fluency required by the 
Court Interpreters Act and the United States Constitution.115 Since the 
court reporter records only what the interpreter says, there is no true record 
of what is stated by the non-English-speaking defendant during the 
 
 
 108. See BENCHBOOK, supra note 52, at 71–72.  
 109. See id. at 71–85.  
 110. Id. In contrast, the Judicial Benchbook provides extensive guidance for federal district judges 
addressing “special trial problems” like the disruptive defendant or a recalcitrant witness. Id. at 157–
69. 
 111. Shulman, supra note 33, at 180.  
 112. See also id. at 182–83. See generally Commission on Gender & Commission on Race & 
Ethnicity, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Equal Treatment in the Courts, 42 VILL. L. REV. 
1355, 1723–24 (1997). 
 113. Id.; Davis et al., supra note 62, at 14–15.  
 114. See Shulman, supra note 33, at 180 (explaining that federal certification is only available for 
Spanish, Navajo, and Haitian-Creole); DUFF, supra note 69, at 27 (noting that among the most 
frequently interpreted languages are Mandarin, Arabic and Portuguese).  
 115. See Shulman, supra note 33, at 186.  
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courtroom proceedings.116 Due to the lack of a true record, appeals 
premised upon inadequate court interpretation are complicated and 
difficult for non-English-speaking defendants.117  
C. The Harms Resulting from Inadequate Court Interpretation in Plea 
Bargains 
1. Harm to the Individual’s Constitutional Rights  
The risk of a violation of a non-English-speaking defendant’s 
constitutional rights is especially high due to the large number of criminal 
cases with non-English-speaking defendants, the prevalence of plea 
bargaining, and the lack of checks for courtroom interpretation.118 At 
minimum, the defendant’s waiver by plea bargain must be “voluntary . . . 
knowing, [and] intelligent,” but this standard only applies to the direct 
consequences of the plea bargain and not to collateral consequences.119 In 
 
 
 116. Id. at 185–86. This gap between the court interpreter’s work and the speaker’s true intent is 
primarily due to differences in dialect or language, bias of the court interpreter, and inaccurate 
translation. Randall T. Shepard, Access to Justice for People Who Do Not Speak English, 40 IND. L. 
REV. 643, 644–48 (2007).  
 117. Id.; see also Kaiser, supra note 80, at 1200. Witnesses can also encounter problems of court 
interpretation. In United States v. Way Quoe Long, 301 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit 
noted that other than the Lao-speaking witness and court interpreter, no one in the district court nor 
any of the lawyers was familiar with either Hmong or Lao. Id. at 1105. The defendant contested the 
accuracy of the interpreter’s work when the defendant attempted to cross-examine a witness who 
spoke only Lao. The court stated “[t]here is no way to know what really happened between the witness 
and the interpreter, nor determine the adequacy of the translation.” Id.  
 118. In part, “[c]ulture and language can also present barriers to a defendant’s knowing and 
intelligent participation in a plea bargain. Understanding of the elements of the charge and the rights 
waived are critical factors.” Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 20, at 211.  
 119. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Immigrant defendants are only required to 
be informed by their counsel of the “direct consequences” of a guilty plea and need not be informed of 
any “collateral consequences.” Molina, supra note 26, at 272. The definition of direct consequences 
are those that have “a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s 
punishment.” Id. In contrast, “collateral consequences” are those that “remain beyond the control and 
responsibility of the district court in which [the] conviction was entered,” which may include 
deportation and civil commitment. Id.  
 Most federal circuits have treated deportation resulting from a guilty plea as a collateral 
consequence rather than a direct consequence. See id. However, the number of individuals deported 
from the United States is extensive—approximately 90,000 criminal aliens are deported a year. Id. at 
269. Of that number, over 80,000 of these defendants are deported based on guilty pleas. Id.  
 If an immigrant defendant has unknowingly pled guilty to a deportable offense, “two lines of 
attack” are available against these guilty pleas. Id. at 268. “Some attempt to withdraw their guilty pleas 
by asserting that due process required the trial court to question and inform them about the 
immigration consequences of the pleas. Others challenge their convictions by alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” Id. (footnotes 
omitted); see generally Kaiser, supra note 80, at 1190–94 (providing a further discussion regarding the 
debate over deportation as a direct or collateral consequence of a plea bargain).  
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fact, courts have vacated pleas where the defense counsel does not fully 
inform the non-English-speaking defendant about the content of the plea 
bargain and the rights waived.120 Plea bargains also present another unique 
challenge; in order to reach an agreed-upon plea bargain, both the 
defendant and the defense counsel participate in out-of-court discussions 
to solidify the terms of the plea bargain. Yet the federal Court Interpreters 
Act places no requirements on interpretation for out-of-court discussions, 
even when these discussions may be essential to courtroom proceedings in 
determining the outcome of the case.121  
Furthermore, non-English-speaking defendants face tough hurdles in 
establishing that inadequate court interpretation occurred at trial. When 
courts have reviewed appeals based on the Act, the courts have stated that 
the Act does not “create . . . or expand existing constitutional 
safeguards.”122 Presently, if the non-English-speaking defendant does not 
object to inadequate court interpretation, the appellate court reviews the 
appeal under the plain error standard of review.123 Under the plain error 
standard, the court will evaluate whether there was error, which was plain, 
that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.124 In proving plain error, 
the defendant has the burden of submitting “sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the district court’s decision . . . affected his substantial 
rights.”125 Nevertheless, courts generally do not find inadequate or 
potentially inadequate interpretation to rise to the level of plain error.126 
Although the Court Interpreters Act requires that an appointed court 
interpreter provide simultaneous translation, an appellate court still has the 
discretion to determine whether the lack of simultaneous translation 
resulted in an unfair trial.127 Similarly, if an interpreter summarizes 
 
 
 120. Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 20, at 213.  
 121. Rearick, supra note 37, at 573 (“Though the Court Interpreters Act of 1978 says nothing 
about facilitating out-of-court communication between attorney and client, the lawyer would clearly 
not be very effective if she did not have a means of communicating at length with her client in 
preparation for trial.”); see also United States v. Medina, No. 82-224/318, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5067, at *4–6 (D. N.J. May 24, 1988) (declining to provide a court interpreter to the non-English-
speaking defendant during plea negotiations because it is not explicitly required by the Court 
Interpreters Act); see also infra note 37.  
 122. United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 123. Pawlosky, supra note 60, at 488; see infra note 129.  
 124. United States v. Gonzales, 339 F.3d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 2003).  
 125. Id. 
 126. Davis et al., supra note 62, at 16; see, e.g., Gonzales, 339 F.3d at 725 (applying the plain 
error standard and declining to reverse the conviction based on a violation of the Court Interpreters 
Act); United States v. Camejo, 333 F.3d 669, 672 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying the plain error standard 
because the defendant failed to object at trial, and affirming the defendant’s conviction). 
 127. United States v. Huang, 960 F.2d 1128, 1135–36 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that summaries, 
rather than literal translation, “do not automatically require reversal” if the deviation did not result in 
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courtroom proceedings for the non-English-speaking defendant, the 
appellate court is not compelled to find that this constitutes plain error.128 
In these types of scenarios, the non-English-speaking defendant is 
disadvantaged because the reviewing court evaluates the appeal under the 
deferential plain error standard of review.129  
2. Harms to the Criminal Justice System  
Inadequate court interpretation also harms the criminal justice system 
by undermining confidence in the system’s fairness. In challenging plea 
bargains based on inadequate court interpretation, non-English-speaking 
defendants must overcome the almost impossible plain error standard of 
review.130 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the plain error 
standard in United States v. Dominguez Benitez.131 In this case, Mr. 
Dominguez Benitez pled guilty to conspiring to possess more than 500 
grams of methamphetamine.132 However, prior to submitting the plea 
agreement, Dominguez Benitez sent multiple letters to the district court 
“express[ing] discomfort with the plea agreement his counsel was 
encouraging him to sign.”133 In response to his letters, the district court 
stated “that it could not help him in plea negotiations” and that the 
circumstance presented “no reason to change counsel.”134 In its opinion, 
 
 
any “substantive inaccuracy”).  
 128. Id. at 1135. However, summary interpreting of courtroom proceedings has been considered 
inadequate to ensure due process. NAT’L ASS’N OF JUDICIARY INTERPRETERS & TRANSLATORS, supra 
note 79, at 31.  
 129. The plain error standard is a difficult standard for a petitioner to appeal under because 
“[p]lain error will be noted only where an error is evident from the record, prejudicially affects a 
substantial right of a litigant, and is of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would cause a 
miscarriage of justice or result in damages to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial 
process.” Davis et al., supra note 62, at 16; see, e.g., United States v. Paz, 981 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 
1992) (explaining that the plain error standard of review requires error that “when examined in the 
context of the entire case, is so obvious and substantial that failure to notice and correct it would affect 
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” and the court applies this standard 
of review if a petitioner has failed to object to inadequate court interpretation); Gonzales, 339 F.3d at 
728 (articulating the application of the plain error standard when a defendant has failed to object 
regarding court interpretation and noting that the court retains “discretionary authority to consider 
plain errors”); Camejo, 333 F.3d at 672 (applying the plain error standard if the defendant made no 
objection about court interpretation, explaining that “[p]lain error is defined as an egregious error, one 
that directly leads to a miscarriage of justice”) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 936 F.2d 262, 266 
(6th Cir. 1991)).  
 130. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004).  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 77.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 77. The Supreme Court noted that it was unclear who helped Dominguez-Benitez write 
the letters in English to the District Court indicating his reluctance to accepting the terms of the plea 
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the Supreme Court noted that Dominguez Benitez “speaks and writes 
Spanish, not English” and that a certified translator was present during his 
proceedings.135 Despite the trial court’s failure to inform Dominguez 
Benitez that he could not withdraw his guilty plea, the Supreme Court 
upheld the plea.136 According to the Supreme Court, Dominguez Benitez 
could not show that “but for” the trial court’s error that he would not have 
pled guilty.137 Under this plain error standard, the possibility of 
successfully attacking a plea bargain—despite serious court interpretation 
flaws—is extremely slim.138 The presence of inadequate court 
interpretation in federal courts highlights how the criminal justice system 
fails to broadly protect non-English-speaking defendants. Therefore, 
inadequate court interpretation not only damages the non-English-
speaking defendant’s individual constitutional rights but also undercuts the 
perception that plea bargains can be fair for defendants.139  
IV. PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE COURT INTERPRETATION AND THE PLEA 
BARGAIN PROCESS 
To address the issues of potentially inadequate court interpretation, a 
number of precautions should be instituted to protect the non-English-
speaking defendant in the plea bargain process. Federal courts can 
implement personnel, technological, or judge-based remedies which 
include increasing checks in the courtroom during the plea colloquy, 
modifying the standard of review for interpreter-required cases, increasing 
the role of the judge in ensuring adequate court interpretation, and 
adopting the safeguards provided for mentally ill individuals in the plea 
bargaining process.  
A. Personnel-Based Remedies 
To guard against inadequate court interpretation during plea bargains, 
the federal government should increase the number of personnel devoted 
to court interpretation. First, federal courts can expand the number of 
 
 
agreement. Id. at 77 n.1. 
 135. Id. at 77 n.1. 
 136. Id. at 84–86.  
 137. Id. 
 138. See supra note 129.  
 139. See generally John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: 
Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants? 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88 (1977); John G. Douglass, Fatal 
Attraction: The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001). 
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federally certified court interpreters. Since federally certified interpreters 
must meet rigorous governmental standards, the level of accuracy in 
interpretation is far more reliable than “otherwise-qualified” court 
interpreters.140 Second, the federal government should consider expansion 
of federal certification to include languages other than Spanish, Navajo, 
and Haitian-Creole. Although increased costs in administering this 
expanded certification program would be unavoidable, the risk to an 
individual’s substantial rights justifies the cost.141  
Another solution to help ferret out inadequate court interpretation 
during the plea bargain process is to assign additional court interpreters to 
such cases. In circumstances where a non-English-speaking defendant 
plans to plead guilty, the court can provide dual interpreters. This option 
would call for a second interpreter to be present in the courtroom to act as 
a check on the first interpreter’s work during the plea colloquy.142  
However, these suggested reforms are likely to fall short due to the cost 
of providing an additional interpreter and the currently small numbers of 
federally certified and “otherwise qualified” interpreters.143 Additionally, a 
second interpreter checking the work of the court-appointed interpreter 
could pose logistical problems. For example, courts would have to 
determine when it is appropriate for a second interpreter to raise concerns 
regarding interpretation during the plea colloquy. If a concern is raised by 
a second interpreter, the court would also have to decide which interpreter 
has the most accurate understanding of a statement by defendant or 
witness. Another shortcoming of additional interpreters is that these 
methods fail to capture the defense attorney’s recommendations and 
statements to the non-English-speaking defendant during the plea 
colloquy. As such, these two methods might not sufficiently safeguard the 
non-English-speaking defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel.  
Another proposal to detect inadequate court interpretation is the 
appointment of a separate defense interpreter. During the plea colloquy, 
the defense interpreter would provide translation specifically for 
discussions between the defense counsel and the non-English-speaking 
defendant while the court-appointed interpreter translates between the 
judge and the non-English-speaking defendant.144 The benefit of a separate 
 
 
 140. Shulman, supra note 33, at 180–81. 
 141. See id. at 192. 
 142. Id. at 193.  
 143. DUFF, supra note 69, at 27.  
 144. William B.C. Chang & Manual U. Araujo, Interpreters for the Defense: Due Process for the 
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defense interpreter is that this interpreter would prioritize the interests of 
the defendant and not merely the interests of the court.145 A separate 
defense interpreter could also interpret out-of-court discussions between 
defense counsel and a non-English-speaking defendant during plea bargain 
negotiations, closing this loophole in the Court Interpreters Act.146 Yet, the 
cost and availability of defense interpreters pose significant obstacles to 
implementing this option.147  
Additional interpreters during the plea colloquy and plea negotiations 
could have prevented Chin’s and Leung’s unwitting guilty pleas by 
immediately detecting inadequate courtroom interpretation.148 In addition, 
a separate defense interpreter for Chin and Leung would have opened the 
lines of communication between the two defendants and their counsel 
during any out-of-court discussions about the plea bargain.149 Adopting 
any of these added checks in court would better protect the individual 
constitutional rights of non-English-speaking defendants and promote the 
integrity of the plea bargain process.  
B. Technology-Based Remedies 
If increasing the number of court interpreters is not feasible, at a 
minimum courts should implement new, efficient technological 
precautions during the plea colloquy between the judge and the non-
English speaking defendant. One low-cost and easily implemented 
technological advancement is allowing for the practice of video 
monitoring. Unlike a traditional court reporter’s transcript, a video record 
of the event will include the original utterances of the non-English-
speaking defendant.150 Footage of this exchange between the judge and the 
non-English-speaking defendant can later be reviewed by other court 
interpreters if there are concerns about the validity of the plea bargain 
 
 
Non-English-Speaking Defendant, 63 CAL. L. REV. 801, 821–22 (1975).  
 145. Id.  
 146. See Lindie, supra note 68, at 420 (providing further information regarding interpretation of 
out-of-court witness statements and admissibility); see also supra note 121.  
 147. See Chang & Araujo, supra note 144, at 821–22.  
 148. Shulman, supra note 33, at 193.  
 149. See Lindie, supra note 68, at 420; see also supra note 121.  
 150. “The court must keep a verbatim record of the plea proceedings, including the court’s advice 
to the defendant, the voluntariness inquiry, the factual accuracy inquiry, and the details of the plea 
agreement.” Shipley & Cleaveland, supra note 99, at 1459; see also Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 
773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000) (“It is extremely difficult to pinpoint direct evidence of translation errors 
without a bilingual transcript of the hearing.”); cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1968) 
(stating that when a judge engages in a plea acceptance discussion with the defendant, “he leaves a 
record adequate for any review that may be later sought”). 
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under Brady.151 Since the defendant’s original statements and demeanor 
are captured on film, the reviewing court interpreters can more accurately 
interpret the defendant’s intent from the footage.152 Currently, most federal 
district courts have access to comparable technology to provide video 
monitoring, or at least, audio monitoring.153 The cost and inconvenience of 
requiring video monitoring for all plea bargains with non-English-
speaking defendants is negligible because of increasing court access to 
technology.154 Therefore, at the very least, courts should require audio or 
video monitoring of the exchanges that take place between the judge and a 
non-English-speaking defendant during the plea colloquy, when the 
defendant requires the use of an interpreter.155  
Use of either audio or video monitoring in court would have aided the 
Leung court’s decision to withdraw Chin’s and Leung’s plea bargains.156 If 
 
 
 151. Fredric I. Lederer, The Effect of Courtroom Technologies on and in Appellate Proceedings 
and Courtrooms, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 251, 256 (2000) (discussing how audio or audio/video 
footage is typically stored on computer hard disks and then “back[ed] up [on] CD media, high-density 
tape, or cassette,” which can be accessed for later review). 
 152. Kaiser, supra note 80, at 1206 (describing the advantages of videotaping or audiotaping 
proceedings where interpreters are required); see also Robert C. Owen & Melissa Mather, Thawing 
Out the “Cold Record”: Some Thoughts on How Videotaped Records May Affect Traditional 
Standards of Deference on Direct and Collateral Review, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 411, 418 (2000) 
(providing examples of how videotaping technology captures aspects of a trial that are not revealed on 
a cold record); Fredric I. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of Today’s—
and Tomorrow’s—High-Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REV. 799, 809 (1999) (explaining that a 
video record “inherently supplies information to an appellate court that is not available though a 
traditional transcript alone”); Lederer, supra note 151, at 253 (noting that on a cold record “witness 
gestures and demeanor often are inadequately set forth in text”). 
 153. See Lederer, supra note 151, at 256 (“Ironically, a large number of court transcripts begin life 
as audio or audio/video recordings.”); see also Owen & Mather, supra note 152, at 412 (describing the 
“advent of reliable and cheap videotaping technology” which allows “trial court proceedings [to be 
taped] with increasing frequency”); Elizabeth C. Wiggins, What We Know and What We Need to Know 
About the Effects of Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 731, 733 (2004) (explaining 
that in a survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center to which ninety federal districts responded, 
sixty-six percent of the district courts had access to digital audio recording and seventy-four percent 
had access to real-time transcript viewer annotation systems). 
 154. Fredric I. Lederer, Technology-Augmented Courtrooms: Progress Amid a Few 
Complications, or the Problematic Interrelationship Between Court and Counsel, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 675, 75–76 (2005).  
 155. Video monitoring has been suggested as a comprehensive solution and not merely limited to 
the problems posed by plea bargaining. Shulman, supra note 33, at 194. Some modifications of this 
solution include random video monitoring when resources are not available for comprehensive video-
monitoring. Under this program, courts would randomly select courtroom proceedings with non-
English-speaking defendants or witnesses to be taped. Kaiser, supra note 80, at 1206. These tapes 
would then be reviewed by other court interpreters for accuracy and sufficiency of interpretation. Id.; 
see also Lederer, supra note 151, at 256 (explaining that audio or audio/video recording can be 
accomplished by using a “single fixed camera image,” a “multi-frame picture that includes four or 
more separate camera images,” or a “voice-activated camera”). 
 156. United States v. Leung, 783 F. Supp. 357, 359–61 (N.D. Ill. 1991).  
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either technological precaution had been in place during Chin and Leung’s 
plea colloquy, the reviewing court would have had a more complete record 
in determining whether inadequate court interpretation had occurred.157 
These technological advancements protect a non-English-speaking 
defendant’s ability to collaterally attack a plea bargain and also broadly 
hold court interpreters accountable for the adequacy of their interpretation 
in the criminal justice system.  
C. Judge-Based Remedies 
In addition to personnel- and technology-based remedies, courts can 
also implement judge-based remedies to address the issue of inadequate 
court interpretation during plea bargains. These judge-based remedies 
include modification of the existing plain error standard of review, greater 
engagement of the judge during the plea colloquy process with the non-
English-speaking defendant, and implementation of the same procedures 
used in reviewing the plea bargains of mentally ill individuals. Unlike 
personnel- and technology-based remedies, judge-based remedies may be 
the most efficient for federal courts to adopt since the cost of 
implementation is low.  
1. Modifying the Standard of Review in Accord with Perez-Lastor 
If a non-English-speaking defendant challenges the adequacy of court 
interpretation on appeal, courts presently apply the plain error standard of 
review when no objection was made at trial.158 Under this standard, the 
defendant must show that the “error was egregious, that it affected 
substantial rights, represented a miscarriage of justice, or resulted in an 
unfair trial.”159 When reviewing courts apply the plain error standard of 
review, the appeals based on inadequate court interpretation are almost 
never granted because the defendant cannot overcome this deferential 
standard.160 Instead, courts should consider applying a “better translation” 
test in reviewing claims based on inadequate interpretation because it is 
fairer to non-English-speaking defendants.  
 
 
 157. Id. at 358–59.  
 158. Davis et al., supra note 62, at 7, 
 159. Id.; see, e.g., Pawlosky, supra note 60, at 459 n.192 (further discussing both the abuse of 
discretion and plain error standards of review and their impact on the non-English-speaking defendant 
appealing based on inadequate court interpretation).  
 160. Davis et al., supra note 62, at 7. 
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In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court adopted a competent 
translation test that the court outlined in Perez-Lastor.161 The Perez-Lastor 
court is distinctive because it carefully examined evidence of the non-
English-speaking defendant’s lack of comprehension of the judicial 
proceedings. In one instance, the Perez-Lastor court stated that if there is 
“direct evidence of incorrectly translated words[,] . . . [this is] persuasive 
evidence of an incompetent translation.”162 The Perez-Lastor court also 
analyzed the responses of the non-English-speaking defendant and found 
that the unresponsive answers provided circumstantial evidence that 
interpretation problems existed.163 In addition, the Perez-Lastor court 
considered that a “translation may also be so inadequate throughout in its 
failure to translate words with precision and to communicate the nuances 
of questions and answers . . . [that it is] impossible . . . to reconstruct the 
dialogue and pinpoint the errors in translation.”164 Lastly, the Perez-Lastor 
court also accepted as evidence the expressions of the non-English-
speaking defendant, which indicated his difficulty in understanding the 
statements and questions directed at him.165 
After examining this language barrier evidence, the Perez-Lastor court 
adopted the “better translation” test. According to this test the court finds 
reversible error if “a better translation would have made a difference in the 
outcome of the hearing.”166 The Perez-Lastor court recognized that “[t]his 
standard is onerous, but not insurmountable.”167 Since non-English-
speaking defendants are already facing an uphill challenge within the 
American justice system, the “better translation” test provides a fairer test 
for the defendant to meet in remedying any inadequate court 
interpretation. Moreover, the Perez-Lastor court also recognized that the 
evidence produced by the defendant can be shown in multiple forms.  
For collateral attacks on plea bargains based on inadequate court 
interpretation, courts could even treat the “better translation” test as a part 
of the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel test.168 If the “better 
translation” test falls under the umbrella of the Strickland test, the defense 
counsel would bear the burden of investigating a non-English-speaking 
 
 
 161. Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2000).  
 162. Id. at 778. 
 163. Id. at 778–79.  
 164. Id. at 780 n.8. 
 165. Id. at 778.  
 166. Id. at 780.  
 167. Id.  
 168. See discussion supra Part III.A.  
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defendant’s language ability and the competence of the court interpreter.169 
In fact, the Supreme Court has held that defense counsel does have a 
responsibility to further investigate under the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel.170 For example, the Supreme Court has 
expanded ineffective assistance of counsel to include a counsel’s failure to 
investigate a defendant’s life history to find mitigating factors in 
sentencing.171 This scenario closely parallels a defense counsel’s failure to 
investigate a defendant’s language ability and the competence of the court 
interpreter. While the Leung court clearly found that a “better translation” 
would have benefited both Chin and Leung,172 the inclusion of the “better 
translation” test within the Strickland test would have given the defense 
counsels the responsibility of investigating the language abilities of the 
defendants and the competence of the court interpreter.173 If both defense 
counsels had adequately investigated the work of Chin and Leung’s court 
interpreter, the counsels would have realized that neither defendant 
understood the basis and impact of a guilty plea.174 Thus, the “better 
translation” test calls for a court to look more broadly to find interpreter 
error and makes it more realistic for a non-English-speaking defendant to 
demonstrate reversible error based on inadequate court interpretation in a 
plea bargain.175  
2. Increasing the Involvement of the Court in the Plea Colloquy 
Courts may also reduce the risk of inadequate court interpretation for 
plea bargains by increasing the judge’s involvement in the plea colloquy. 
A simple practice that federal courts can adopt is to provoke a narrative 
response from the non-English-speaking defendant during the plea 
colloquy to make certain that the guilty plea is “knowing and 
 
 
 169. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).  
 170. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003).  
 171. Id. at 522. In Wiggins, the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was based 
on defense counsel’s decision to “limit the scope of . . . investigation into potential mitigating 
evidence.” Id. at 521. In this case, the Court applied the Strickland standard to see if the counsel’s 
actions were reasonable in light of the circumstances. Id. at 521–22. Additionally, the Court noted that 
“in any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s 
judgments.” Id. In its decision, the Court held that the petitioner’s counsel did not provide effective 
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because the failure to investigate was not 
reasonable and prejudiced the defendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 534–38.  
 172. United States v. Leung, 783 F. Supp. 357, 360–61 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 173. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.  
 174. Id.; Leung, 783 F. Supp. at 358–59.  
 175. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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voluntary.”176 A narrative response from the non-English-speaking 
defendant, even with the aid of an interpreter, would give a federal judge a 
clearer assurance of a plea bargain’s validity than the existing perfunctory 
yes or no questions part of the typical plea colloquy.177 By asking the non-
English-speaking defendant questions that trigger a narrative response, the 
federal judge has more of an opportunity to evaluate whether the 
defendant is aware of the constitutional rights being waived and the direct 
consequences of a guilty plea.178 Although narrative questioning may slow 
down the efficiency of a plea colloquy, courts have adopted narrative 
questioning when defendants waive substantial rights in conflict of interest 
and pro se hearings.179 In conflict of interest hearings, judges elicit 
narrative responses from defendants to ensure that defendants understand 
the complex issue of attorney-client conflicts of interest.180 Like conflict of 
interest hearings, courts will ask the defendant about familiarity with the 
law and even test the defendant’s choice to forgo counsel with relevant 
hypotheticals during pro se hearings.181 The Judicial Benchbook should 
 
 
 176. Leung, 783 F. Supp. at 358–60.  
 177. As stated in United States v. Leung: 
The extent of the dialogue required between the court and the defendant to establish an 
intelligent and voluntary plea varies from case to case, but in all cases it must be a meaningful 
dialogue. Simple yes or no answers, or answers which merely mimic the indictment will not 
suffice. The court should question the defendant in a way that provokes a narrative response. 
Leung, 783 F. Supp. at 360 (citing United States v. Fountain, 777 F.2d 351, 356 (7th Cir. 1985)). In 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit found that due process was protected where the record indicated the 
“painstaking efforts of the immigration judge to provide a full and fair hearing” and the judge’s 
“sensitivity to the potential for linguistic and other confusion.” United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 
763 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit evaluated the record at trial and established 
that:  
The transcript of the hearing shows that (1) Nicholas-Armenta was the thirty-third 
respondent; (2) it was conducted through an interpreter; and (3) the entire hearing lasted only 
an hour and twenty-five minutes, including time for translation. Despite these disadvantages, 
however, the transcript reflects the judge’s careful and, where necessary, particularized, 
inquiries of each of the 33 persons before him, and his sensitivity to the potential for 
linguistic and other confusion on the part of those facing deportation. 
Id.; cf. BENCHBOOK, supra note 52, at 72–80. 
 178. See supra note 118.  
 179. See supra note 177.  
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Osborne, 402 F.3d 626, 631 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that “the court 
should seek to elicit a narrative response from each defendant that he has been advised of his right to 
effective representation, [and] that he understands the details of his attorney’s possible conflict of 
interest and the potential perils of such a conflict”); United States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 560 n.2 
(5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “the court should seek to elicit a narrative response from each 
defendant . . . that he understands the details of his attorney’s possible conflict of interest and the 
potential perils of such a conflict”); United States v. Gilliam, 975 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(requiring the court to “seek to elicit a narrative response from each defendant . . . that he understands 
the details of his attorney’s possible conflict of interest and the potential perils of such a conflict”).  
 181. See BENCHBOOK, supra note 52, at 6.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss2/4
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call for federal judges to participate in this narrative questioning whenever 
a court interpreter is appointed under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
28 and the non-English-speaking defendant is preparing to plead guilty. 
This procedure would help detect any problems with the adequacy of the 
court interpretation and make sure that the non-English-speaking 
defendant’s plea meets the Brady standard.182  
Federal judges can also require defense counsel to utilize a modified 
plea bargain “checklist” during out-of-court discussions when the defense 
counsel explains the content and effect of a plea agreement to the 
defendant.183 This checklist requires that defendants initial each 
component of the checklist that specifies a term of the plea bargain.184 
During this checklist process, the defense counsel asks the defendant 
through an interpreter to summarize the content and effect of each 
component of the plea to demonstrate that the Brady standards are met.185 
Afterwards, the initialed checklist is submitted to the court before the 
court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.186 The effectiveness of such a 
checklist operates upon the good faith of the defense counsel in fulfilling 
its requirements.187 Although the checklist may add additional work to an 
already burdened defense counsel, the benefit of protecting a non-English 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right outweighs this concern.188 The 
checklist is a low-cost solution that protects the integrity of the plea 
bargain process by making certain that defendants are meeting the Brady 
standard during guilty pleas.189  
Increasing the court’s involvement during the plea colloquy or 
requiring a checklist could have prevented the initial unknowing guilty 
pleas by Chin and Leung.190 If the trial court had triggered narrative 
responses from both Chin and Leung, the court would have realized that 
neither Chin nor Leung understood the meaning and impact of a guilty 
plea.191 Instead of the standard, “Do you understand the terms of your plea 
 
 
 182. See supra notes 177 and 180.  
 183. Interview with Emily Hughes, Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of 
Law, in St. Louis, Mo. (Feb. 15, 2008) (transcript on file with author) (discussing a procedure 
implemented by Iowa Senior State Judge Vern Robinson for plea bargains).  
 184. Id. The checklist is printed in the non-English-speaking defendant’s native language. Id.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
 188. See discussion supra Part III.A.  
 189. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.  
 190. United States v. Leung, 783 F. Supp. 357, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1991).  
 191. Id.; see also discussion supra Part IV.C.  
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agreement?,”192 the Leung court could have asked both defendants, “Can 
you explain to me the terms of your plea agreement?” and, “What is the 
basis of your plea agreement?”193 Had the trial court asked either Chin or 
Leung these questions, the court would have quickly realized that the 
defendants did not understand the basis and impact of the guilty plea.194 
Likewise, if both Chin’s and Leung’s counsels had faithfully completed a 
plea bargain “checklist,” the defendants would have had full understanding 
of the plea before the plea colloquy.195 Increasing the court’s involvement 
during the plea colloquy would simultaneously diminish the possibility of 
inadequate court interpretation during the plea bargain process and 
decrease collateral attacks on plea bargains based on inadequate court 
interpretation.  
3. Adopting the Dusky Standard or Bonnie Approach for Mentally Ill 
Individuals in the Non-English-Speaking Defendants Context  
Federal courts can also adopt a modified version of the precautions 
currently in place for mentally ill individuals who plan to plead guilty. The 
same concern of voluntariness is raised when both mentally ill individuals 
and non-English-speaking individuals plead guilty because of questions of 
comprehension.196 Presently, the Supreme Court applies the Dusky test for 
mentally ill defendants and prohibits these defendants from proceeding to 
trial if they lack “the capacity to understand the nature and object of the 
proceedings against [them], to consult with counsel, and to assist in 
preparing [their] defense.”197 Moreover, the trial judges have the 
responsibility to monitor the defendant’s behavior through trial and use 
“their judgment to decide if an evaluation for competency is warranted.”198 
“All jurisdictions in the United States” follow a two-pronged Dusky 
competency test: “A judge must evaluate: (1) the defendant’s capacity to 
understand the charges and nature of the criminal proceedings; and (2) the 
defendant’s ability to assist counsel in defending against the charges.”199 
 
 
 192. See supra note 79.  
 193. See supra notes 171–72.  
 194. Leung, 783 F. Supp. at 358–59. 
 195. Id. at 361; see discussion supra Part IV.C.  
 196. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399–401 (1993); see also discussion supra Part III.C.  
 197. Marshall, supra note 29, at 1187 (alteration in original); see Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 
402, 402 (1960).  
 198. Marshall, supra note 29, at 1188.  
 199. Id. However, the Supreme Court decided in Godinez v. Moran that the level of competence 
required to plead guilty or waive counsel is not any greater than the competency level required for 
defendants to stand trial. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400–01. According to the Court, the Dusky standard 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss2/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] LOST IN INTERPRETATION 477 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, the federal Judicial Benchbook provides sample questions 
that the court should ask the defendant of questionable mental competency 
to satisfy the Dusky standard.200  
In determining whether a guilty plea is voluntary, courts presently do 
not explicitly consider the ability of a non-English-speaking defendant to 
assist counsel.201 This second prong should be adopted because the 
contents of guilty pleas are heavily reliant on facts.202 In order for the 
defense counsel to effectively serve the interests of the defendant, the 
defendant needs to be able to communicate these facts to the defense 
counsel.203  
Another suggestion has been proposed by Professor Richard J. Bonnie 
in assessing the competence of criminal defendants. Professor Bonnie’s 
approach could also be applied to the setting of non-English-speaking 
defendants within the plea bargain process. According to Professor 
Bonnie, the court should evaluate the defendant’s competence to assist 
counsel and his or her decisional competence.204 The defendant’s ability to 
communicate with his or her counsel “can profoundly influence the 
outcome of . . . plea bargains . . . [because] facts and descriptions of the 
 
 
“satisfies due process when the defendant is seeking to waive any constitutional right.” Marshall, 
supra note 29, at 1188.  
 200. See BENCHBOOK, supra note 52, at 57–65 (providing examples of questions that federal 
district judges should ask of defendants who may be mentally ill and explaining the responsibility of 
federal district judges in determining the competency to plead guilty).  
 201. See discussion supra Part III.A.  
 202. Marshall, supra note 29, at 1197–98.  
 203. Id.; see supra note 104.  
 204. Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 554–61 (1993). Professor Bonnie’s approach “competence to assist counsel” 
breaks down to the defendant possessing the ability to:  
1. Understand[] the nature and purpose of criminal prosecution and punishment and the nature 
of the adversary process, especially the role of defense counsel.  
2. Capacity to understand the criminal charge(s).  
3. Appreciation of one’s own situation as a defendant in a criminal prosecution.  
4. Capacity to recognize and relate pertinent information to counsel concerning the facts of 
the case.  
Id. at 562. In addressing the second step of “decisional competence,” Professor Bonnie looks at 
[a]bility to express a stable preference[,] . . . [a]bility to understand nature and consequences 
of decision[,] . . . [a]bility to express plausible (i.e., not grossly irrational) reasons for the 
decision[,] . . . [a]bility to understand reasons for alternative courses of action (risks and 
benefits)[,] . . . [a]bility to appreciate significance of this information in one’s own case[, and] 
. . . [a]bility to use logical processes to compare and weigh risks and benefits of alternative 
courses of action.  
Id. at 576; see also Marshall, supra note 29, at 1187; Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The 
Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1581, 1595 (2000) (further describing Professor Bonnie’s approach to competence to effectively assist 
counsel, and decisional competence).  
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alleged crime . . . help [defendants’] attorneys assess the strength of the 
prosecution’s case and can give them leverage in plea negotiations.”205 
Professor Bonnie’s “decisional competence” test is more comprehensive 
than the Dusky standard because it requires the defendant to explain the 
decision to plead guilty.206 Application of Professor Bonnie’s two-step test 
would be helpful in assessing a non-English-speaking defendant’s 
awareness of the content and effect of the plea bargain because it provides 
a detailed guideline for judges in assessing the voluntariness of a 
defendant’s decision. While this proposal may have the same benefits as 
narrative questioning, this line of questioning targets only a few areas for 
follow-up by the court.207 Since Professor Bonnie’s test requires that 
defendants know the full consequences of a guilty plea, this test could 
resolve the problem of defendant’s lacking information regarding 
collateral consequences of a plea bargain.208 This test would also help 
ensure that the non-English-speaking defendant is both communicating 
effectively with his or her counsel during plea negotiations and aware that 
pleading guilty has serious consequences.  
Either a modified Dusky standard or the Bonnie proposal would have 
helped catch the inadequate court interpretation during Chin’s and Leung’s 
plea bargains. Although the Leung court allowed Chin and Leung to 
withdraw their plea bargains, the Leung court would have found that 
neither defendant was able to properly assist his counsel under the second 
prong of Dusky and allowed for a collateral attack on this ground.209 
Likewise, if Professor Bonnie’s “decisional competence” test were in 
place, the court would have triggered narrative responses during the plea 
colloquy and found that neither Chin nor Leung understood the impacts of 
a guilty plea.210 Adoption of the Dusky standard or the Bonnie proposal 
would systematically reduce the risk of inadequate court interpretation and 
create greater confidence in the fairness of the plea bargain process. 
 
 
 205. Marshall, supra note 29, at 1197.  
 206. Bonnie, supra note 204, at 576.  
 207. Id.; see discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 208. See discussion supra Part IV.D and note 116.  
 209. United States v. Leung, 783 F. Supp. 357, 358–61 (N.D. Ill. 1991). In one example, Leung 
did not fully explain his role in the gambling business to the defense counsel and later told the court 
that he “just worked there” and “cash[ed] chips.” Id. at 358.  
 210. Id. at 360–61.  
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D. Weighing the Effectiveness of the Different Remedies 
A few of these proposed solutions can be easily implemented with 
immediate results. First, video monitoring is a low-cost and efficient 
method of detecting and remedying inadequate court interpretation.211 
Video monitoring will not encourage frivolous collateral attacks on plea 
bargains based on inadequate interpretation. With video monitoring, the 
reviewing interpreter must carefully examine the video footage to 
determine if the collateral attack of the plea bargain is indeed a valid 
concern.212 Furthermore, courts should err in favor of reducing invalid plea 
bargains even at the cost of possibly encouraging more collateral attacks 
on plea bargains.213 Second, courts could easily employ narrative 
questioning and a defendant checklist, which would prevent unknowing 
pleas.214 Requiring the court to ask a few more questions during the plea 
colloquy is a light burden if balanced against the possible violation of a 
non-English-speaking defendant’s substantial rights.215 This option would 
concededly add more time to each plea colloquy but would not cost the 
court any expenses to exercise. In contrast, adding more interpreters would 
cost more than video monitoring and narrative questioning by the court.216 
Adopting the “better translation” test would also be an unwieldy solution. 
While the “better translation” test would allow for courts to more 
effectively detect inadequate court interpretation, changing the standard of 
review lacks immediate preventative effects and its benefits overlap the 
video monitoring proposal.217 Setting into place any one of these solutions 
would decrease the possibility that inadequate court interpretation would 
harm a non-English-speaking defendant’s constitutional rights during a 
plea bargain.  
CONCLUSION 
Chin and Leung pled guilty without understanding the charges against 
them, knowing the basis of the charges, or comprehending the significance 
of the guilty plea. But no one stopped them from pleading guilty—neither 
their counsel nor the judge. Only after their guilty pleas were entered, did 
 
 
 211. See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 212. See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 213. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.  
 214. See discussion supra Part IV.C.  
 215. See discussion supra Part III.A.  
 216. See discussion supra Part III.A–B.  
 217. See discussion supra Part III.A–C.  
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Chin realize that he would be “regarded as a criminal” and Leung 
understand that he had entered into a deal that he would not have accepted 
even if there had been a “gun to his head.”218  
Although federal courts continue to resolve more cases involving non-
English-speaking defendants through plea bargains, almost no checks exist 
to guarantee that these court interpreters are adequately conveying the 
defendant’s words to the court or the court’s message to the defendant 
during the plea bargain. While guilty pleas are required to be voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent, a court cannot be absolutely assured under the 
present circumstances that this standard is met if the defendant does not 
speak the language of the court and is entirely dependent upon the court 
interpreter. Without precautions to ensure adequate interpretation, the very 
validity of these plea bargains is questioned. The risk is unacceptably high 
that inadequate court interpretation could cause non-English-speaking 
defendants to unknowingly or involuntarily waive constitutional rights in a 
plea agreement. Federal courts should take steps toward reducing this risk 
by adopting safeguards; otherwise, involuntary pleas, like those of Chin 
and Leung, will continue to occur.  
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